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I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal justice rulings from the United States Supreme Court’s
2013–2014 term are likely to be overshadowed in public discussions by
debates concerning the Court’s two landmark five-to-four decisions in other
policy spheres. 1 In one, a narrow majority exempted family-owned
companies, based on the religious objections of the companies’ owners, from
providing certain types of otherwise required health coverage.2 In the other,
*
Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, Case
Western Reserve University; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 1999, Washington
University, St. Louis.
*
Associate Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989,
University of Akron; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 2004, Washington University,
St. Louis.
*
Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., 1980, Harvard
University; M.Sc., 1981, University of Bristol (England); J.D., 1984, University of Tennessee;
Ph.D., 1988, University of Connecticut.
1
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rejects Contraceptives Mandate for Some
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/hobbylobby-case-supreme-court-contraception.html?_r=0 ; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes
Down Overall Political Donation Cap, N.Y.TIMES, (April 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-contributions.html.
2
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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the same marginally-winning coalition struck down longstanding limits on
the total amount of money one can contribute to candidates for federal office,
political parties, and political action committees.3 In these salient cases the
Court returned to the topics of the Affordable Care Act and campaign
finance—issues for which the Justices rendered other, controversial decisions
in recent years.4
The latest Supreme Court Term lacked a blockbuster criminal justice
case to match those in previous Roberts Court Terms.5 Bond v. United States
appeared to be this type of case for the 2013–2014 Term, with potentially
significant implications for the roles of federal and state governments in
prosecuting crimes. 6 Political conservatives hoped Bond would rein in
congressional authority to criminalize certain domestic acts as part of the
implementation of an international treaty.7 The majority instead avoided a
controversial ruling on Congress’s treaty power, deciding the case on more
limited grounds.8
Yet, several highlights from the past Term warrant a systematic
examination of the Court decisions and individual voting patterns in criminal
justice cases. For example, in 2013–2014 the Court ruled on issues
consequential to most of society, such as privacy expectations given the
3

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). (In both
Burwell and McCutcheon, the majority included Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy).
4
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.., 26 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.) See Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding Congress’s power to enact most
provisions of the Affordable Care Act, commonly called Obamacare); and Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding the First Amendment prohibits the
government from restricting political independent expenditures by corporations, associations,
or labor unions).
5
See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (upholding a state’s
practice of taking warrantless DNA samples from all suspects arrested for certain serious
offenses); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (upholding
suspicionless strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses before being placed in the
general inmate population); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010) (incorporating
individuals’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (finding that the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life without
parole for a non-homicide crime violates the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407 (2008) (ruling that punishing the crime of rape of a child with the death sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (ruling
that the prohibition on possessing handguns in the home in the District of Columbia violates
the Second Amendment); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (ruling that the G.W.
Bush administration’s use of military commissions to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay
violates the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva Conventions).
6
Bond V. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
7
See, e.g., George F. Will, Carol Bond Case Showcases Government run Amok,
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013 (calling Bond “the most momentous case” of the Term); and U.S.
Senator Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F., 93, at 95 (2014) (“How
the Court resolves Bond could have enormous implications for our constitutional structure.”).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 169–197.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/1

2

McCall et al.: The 2013-2014 United States Supreme Court Term

2015]

2013–2014 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

363

growing use of advanced technologies in our daily lives, 9 as well as on
questions directly involving a relatively small subset of the populace, such as
what level of safeguards will be deemed sufficient when imposing death
sentences on convicted individuals with developmental disabilities.10 As the
Justices grappled with balancing concern for individuals’ rights with
governmental efforts to control crime,11 several themes that emerged in prior
years also characterized the 2013–2014 Term.12 However, the most striking
feature from analyzing the Term’s criminal justice decisions and voting
tendencies may be the number of atypical findings. As discussed in the
quantitative and qualitative analyses to follow, some of these were unique
developments for the Roberts Court era in the area of criminal justice.13
II. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION MAKING
During the 2013–2014 Term, the Supreme Court handed down fewer
full, signed decisions on criminal justice issues—twenty-one—than in any of
the previous eight Terms of the Roberts Court era. 14 Yet, criminal justice
9

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
11
For an influential discussion of tensions arising from two competing value
systems in criminal justice (the crime control and due process models), see Herbert Packer,
Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1964).
12
For example, Justice Kennedy’s place in the divided Court continues to make
him especially influential, see infra note 55 and accompanying text, just as in the prior term it
was noted that “statistics demonstrate that Justice Kennedy’s vote continues to be the most
valuable one.” Adam Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme Court to the Right Step By Step, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/roberts-plays-a-longgame.html?_r=0.
13
See infra Parts II & III; see infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
14
Excluded from analyses in this Article are the Court’s per curiam rulings in
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Martinez v.
Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070 (2014); Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014). This does not
count separately United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014), which was consolidated with
Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). In each of the previous eight Terms, the Roberts Court decided,
on average, about 28 criminal justice cases with full, signed opinions. The number of these
decisions is as follows: 23 during the 2012–2013 Term; 29 in 2011–2012; 31 in 2010–2011;
29 in 2009–2010; 33 in 2008–2009; 26 in 2007–2008; 22 in 2006–2007; and 30 in 2005–
2006. See Michael A. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2012–2013 United States
Supreme Court Term, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 35, 38 (2014) [hereinafter 2012–2013 Term];
Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2011–2012 United States Supreme Court
Term, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 239, 244 (2013) [hereinafter 2011–2012 Term]; Madhavi M.
McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2010–2011 United States Supreme Court Term, 53 S.
TEX. L. REV. 307, 312 (2011) [hereinafter 2010–2011 Term]; Michael A. McCall et al.,
Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term , 41 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 230
(2011) [hereinafter 2009–2010 Term]; Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2008–
2009 Term]; Michael A. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007–
2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 36–38 (2008) [hereinafter 2007–2008 Term]; Michael A.
McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2006–2007 United States Supreme Court Term, 76
10
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policy areas continued to figure prominently in the Court’s rulings15 as 37%
of the cases decided during the 2013–2014 Term addressed key questions
concerning the administration of justice and the rights of individuals drawn
into contact with the criminal justice system, albeit on a historically small
Supreme Court docket. 16
Scholars who study judicial behavior often label decisions and
Justices as being predominantly conservative or liberal. 17 We adopt these
UMKC L. REV. 993, 995–96 (2008) [hereinafter 2006–2007 Term]; and Christopher E. Smith
et al., Criminal Justice and the 2005–2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 495, 499 (2007) [hereinafter 2005–2006 Term].
15
See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1229–33 (2012) (showing over time the
growing presence of criminal procedure and due process cases on the Court’s docket, decline
in the frequency of certain other types of cases like economic ones, and a decrease in the total
number of cases heard by the Court per Term); and Adam Liptak, In New Term, Supreme
Court Shifts Focus to Crime and First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), htt
p://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/us/supreme-court-turns-to-criminal-and-first-amendmentcases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Now, criminal justice is at the heart of the court’s docket
. . . ”).
16
See Kedar Bhatia, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2013 and key takeaways,
SCOTUSBLOG, (July 3, 2014, 9:00 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/final-stat-packfor-october-term-2013-and-key-takeaways-2/ (drawing on two different datasets to report that
the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer cases with signed opinions than
in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term (65) and the 1864–1865 Term
(55)). See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1229–33 (2012) (showing over time the growing
presence of criminal procedure and due process cases on the Court’s docket, decline in the
frequency of certain other types of cases like economic ones, and a decrease in the total
number of cases heard by the Court per Term); see also Adam Liptak, In New Term, Supreme
Court Shifts Focus to Crime and First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, A17 (“Now,
criminal justice is at the heart of the court’s docket…”). See Bhatia supra note 16 (noting that
during the 2013–2014 Term, the Roberts Court handed down 73 merits opinions). We
identified 27 decisions (37%) addressing important questions in the area of criminal justice.
Of these 27 criminal justice cases, 21 were decided with full, signed opinions and are analyzed
in this Article, five were per curiam decisions, and one was a criminal justice case that was
consolidated with another. See infra Part III.A–D; see supra notes 15–16. The primary
question addressed did not need to be a criminal justice issue for a case to be included in this
study. Rather, the selection process involved reading all Court decisions for the Term to
identify those raising key issues in the area of criminal justice, though other additional types
of issues may have been addressed; supra Bhatia, at Signed Opinions (drawing on two
different datasets to report that the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer
cases with signed opinions than in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term
(65) and the 1864–1865 Term (55)). Supra Bhatia, at Signed Opinions (drawing on two
different datasets to report that the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer
cases with signed opinions than in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term
(65) and the 1864–1865 Term (55)).
17
E.g., Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns, & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How
Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SC. 74 (2011) (using cases
with liberal outcomes that reversed lower court rulings to test the influence of public opinion
on Supreme Court decisions); e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey
A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1490–91 (2007) (documenting ideological movement among almost
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labels, and throughout this Article categorize as “liberal” those decisions that
are supportive of claims by the criminally accused or convicted.18 Decisions
labeled as “conservative” are those favoring the government’s assertions of
authority embodied in decisions and actions by police, prosecutors, and
judges.19 These definitions follow those in the widely used Supreme Court
Database, though we independently classified all individual votes and case
outcomes analyzed here. 20 When cases presented Justices with questions in
multiple issue areas, coding exclusively considered the criminal justice
context.21
Table 1 summarizes the Supreme Court’s criminal justice decisions
from the 2013–2014 Term by the conservative/liberal direction of outcome
and the size of the majority. A notable feature of the distribution is the
unusually large percentage of cases ending without dissent. With all nine
Justices agreeing in judgment in more than three of every five cases, this
Term witnessed the highest portion of criminal justice cases decided
unanimously during the Roberts Court era to date.22 However, other recent
patterns caution against attributing this to factors such as a systematic shift in
decision making processes on the Court that might signal an enduring trend.
For example, just two years earlier, the Court posted the lowest rate of
all Justices as they become more liberal or conservative over time); Jeffery A. Segal & Albert
D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 557 (1989) (using content analysis of newspaper editorials to estimate Justices’
ideological scores which are then compared to their voting trends); e.g. Christopher E. Smith,
Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 99
(2010) (examining one of the areas that helped cast Stevens as leader of the Court’s liberal
wing in criminal justice cases).
18
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the
Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base Project, 73
JUDICATURE 103 (1989) (“Liberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are pro-person
accused or convicted of crime, pro-civil liberties claimant or civil rights claimant, proindigent, pro-[Native American] and anti-government in due process and privacy.”).
19
Id.
20
Harold J. Spaeth, et. al., Online Code Book, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE,
Version 2014 Release 01 (2014), http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation
.php?var=decisionDirection (last visited July 24, 2014).
21
E.g., The Court held in McCullen v. Coakley that a state law establishing a
buffer zone outside of abortion clinics violated the First Amendment. McCullen v. Coakley,
134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). The decision is liberal with respect to the First Amendment, liberal
with respect to criminal justice, and conservative with respect to abortion/reproductive rights.
For purposes of this study, the decision is coded only in the context of invalidating a criminal
law (liberal).
22
The proportion of criminal justice cases decided without dissent during the
2013–2014 Term jumps to over 70% (19 of 27) if the five per curium opinions are included,
and if the consolidated cases are treated separately. See supra notes 18, 20. The Court handed
down fourteen unanimous criminal justice rulings during the 2010–2011 Term (one more than
during the 2013–2014 Term). However, no prior Term of the Roberts Court posted a higher
percentage of criminal justice cases decided by a unanimous Court. See, 2012–2013 Term,
supra note 14; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14; 2009–2010
Term, supra note 14; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14; 2006–
2007 Term, supra note 14; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14.
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unanimous decisions in criminal justice cases since at least the 1994–1995
Term.23 Thus, it is likely that recent swings in the share of criminal justice
cases decided unanimously are pushed more by the different grouping of
issues heard in various Terms than by fundamental changes in the general
level of agreement on the Court.24
TABLE 1:
Case Distribution by Vote and Liberal/Conservative Outcome in
U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 2013–2014 Term25
Vote

Liberal

Conservative

Total

9-0

5

8

13 (61.9%)

8-1

0

0

0 (0.0%)

7-2

1

0

1 (4.8%)

6-3

0

3

3 (14.3%)

5-4

1

3

4 (19.0%)

7 (33.3%)

14 (66.7%)

21 (100.0%)

______________________________________________________________
The dominance of conservative rulings during the 2013–2014 Term,
especially in those cases that most divided the high court, provides another
striking characteristic of criminal justice rulings during the most recent
Term. Some might predict this to be the norm based upon common
depictions of the Court’s conservatism and current membership that includes
five Justices usually portrayed as political conservatives.26 Yet, in past years
the Roberts Court often produced a more balanced split in the number of its
23

See, 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 242.
See, e.g., Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Change
and Voting Change: An Analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s 1986–1991 Terms, 48 POL. RES. Q.
837, 849–52 (1995) (explaining that changes in patterns of Supreme Court decisions are a
function of different factors including changes in the nature of issues that the Court decided in
specific Terms).
25
See infra Part III.A–D.
26
See, e.g., David Cole, The Roberts Court: What Kind of Conservatives? N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013, 9:43 AM) http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013
/oct/07/roberts–court-what-kind-conservatives/ (describing the Roberts Court as “a
confidently conservative institution” and predicting that in major cases in the 2013–2014
Term, “the real question is not whether the conservatives will win, but how they win”); Adam
Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?pagewanted=all, (reporting on a
statistical analysis of Court eras and noting that current members Roberts, Scalia, Alito and
Thomas rank among the six most conservative Justices to sit on the Court since 1937, and that
Kennedy is among the top ten); Joan Biskupic, Reshaped Supreme Court Charts New Era,
USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington
/judicial/2010-10-01-court01_ST_N.htm (“The court under Chief Justice John Roberts has
pushed the law to the right”).
24
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liberal and conservative criminal justice rulings.27 Moreover, in all but two of
the previous eight Terms, five-member majorities have been more likely to
favor claims of individual suspects, defendants, or convicted offenders than
to support interests of justice system officials.28 The atypical distribution of
decisions by direction of outcome during the 2013–2014 Term, then, further
suggests the importance of examining the specific criminal justice issues
considered by the Court this past year.29
Table 2 presents the voting patterns for individual Justices along the
liberal-conservative dimension, as well as the degree to which each Justice
supported the majority position by direction of outcome. Unlike previous
Terms, the voting tendencies do not reveal immediately the liberal and
conservative wings of the Court; typically, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Alito, Thomas, Scalia, and—to a lesser extent—Kennedy vote for
conservative outcomes notably more often than do Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. 30 The relative scarcity of non-unanimous criminal
justice decisions in the 2013–2014 Term may have obscured this usually
clear dividing line. It is presumably in non-unanimous decisions that the
sincerest representations of judicial preferences are most likely to be
expressed given that there is little need to compromise, at least not for the
sake of unanimity.31 Thus, the reduced opportunity in the most recent Term
to express such preferences likely compressed the ideological distance
between the Justices. Notably, the only Justices to support both nonunanimous liberal outcomes were those traditionally depicted as members of
the Court’s liberal wing (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan),32
and the more moderate conservative (Justice Kennedy).33
27

E.g., 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 38 (showing that 12 of the Court’s
criminal justice decisions ended in a liberal outcome that Term while 11 could be
characterized as conservative).
28
Criminal justice cases ending in a five-to-four or five-to-three vote produced
more conservative than liberal decisions during the 2008–2009 Term and during the 2006–
2007 Term. See 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 4; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at
995–96. In all other previous Terms of the Roberts Court, more liberal than conservative
decisions were handed down by five-member majorities. See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note
14, at 38; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 244; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 312;
2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 230; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 38; 2005–2006
Term, supra note 14, at 499.
29
See infra Part III.
30
See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 26 (placing the conservatism of Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, JJ. into historical context); and 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14,
at 247 (showing that Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ. each voted for conservative
outcomes in more than 60% of non-unanimous criminal justice cases that Term, while the rate
for Kennedy, J. was about 41%, and was less than 25% for Kagan, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Ginsburg).
31
This logic extends to en banc courts more generally. See Christopher E. Smith,
Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 134 (1990).
32
See, e.g., Hannah Fairfield & Adam Liptak, A More Nuanced Breakdown of
the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/
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TABLE 2:
Voting Rates by Justice in Non-unanimous (and All) Criminal Justice
Decisions, 2013–2014 Term34
Justice

Percent
Conservative
Voting

Percent in the
Majority

Voted with
Conservative
Majority

Voted with
Liberal
Majority

Alito

87.5 (71.4)

62.5 (85.7)

5 of 6 (13 of 14)

0 of 2 (5 of 7)

Thomas

75.0 (66.7)

50.0 (81.0)

4 of 6 (12 of 14)

0 of 2 (5 of 7)

Kennedy

75.0 (66.7)

100.0 (100.0)

6 of 6 (14 of 14)

2 of 2 (7 of 7)

Roberts

50.0 (57.1)

50.0 (81.0)

3 of 6 (11 of 14)

1 of 2 (6 of 7)

Scalia

50.0 (57.1)

50 (81.0)

3 of 6 (11 of 14)

1 of 2 (6 of 7)

Breyer

50.0 (57.1)

75.0 (90.5)

4 of 6 (12 of 14)

2 of 2 (7 of 7)

Kagan

50.0 (57.1)

75.0 (90.5)

4 of 6 (12 of 14)

2 of 2 (7 of 7)

Ginsburg

37.5 (52.4)

62.5 (85.7)

3 of 6 (11 of 14)

2 of 2 (7 of 7)

Sotomayor

12.5 (42.9)

37.5 (76.2)

1 of 6 (9 of 14)

2 of 2 (7 of 7)

______________________________________________________________
Despite the compression of individual voting rates by direction of
outcome, Justice Alito again distinguished himself as the most conservative
member of the Court in criminal justice cases. 35 The 2013–2014 Term,
however, did record Alito’s first departure from a conservative majority in a
criminal justice case since arriving on the Court in 2006. When the majority
in Abramski v. United States36 ruled against a man who purchased a firearm
for another buyer but did not disclose that intent on a federal form, Alito

upshot/a-more-nuanced-breakdown-of-the-supreme-court.html?_r=0 (last visited July 26,
2014).
33
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37,
40–1 (2008).
34
Data regard the eight non-unanimous and twenty-one total criminal justice
cases analyzed in this Article. See infra Part III.A–D.
35
Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice Samuel Alito, NY TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar.
20, 2011, MM13 (drawing on statistical analysis to report that Alito “has ruled for the defense
in only 17% of the criminal cases he has heard since he joined the court, putting him to the
right of Roberts, Scalia, Thomas—and every other justice of the past 65 years other than
William Rehnquist . . . .”; and 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at n32 (“In each Term from
2006–2007 through 2010–2011, Justice Alito posted the most conservative voting record in
criminal justice cases . . . .”).
36
Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).
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joined Scalia’s dissenting opinion along with Roberts and Thomas. 37 The
case also marks the first time these four conservative Justices dissented from
a conservative criminal justice decision, 38 and illustrates the occasional
discrepancy between the use of conservative and liberal labels here versus in
common political discourse. Because the decision in Abramski is pro-law
enforcement and anti-defendant, it is coded as conservative. However,
support among the broader population for restrictions on gun purchases and
ownership is stronger among political liberals.
All members of the Court except Justice Sotomayor voted to support
a conservative outcome in at least half of the criminal justice cases decided
this Term.39 Some maintain Sotomayor’s liberalism in the area of criminal
justice40 and her general approach to cases reflect a sensitivity she developed
through life experiences to certain claims against government.41 Sotomayor’s
lone conservative vote in a non-unanimous criminal justice case was also
cast in the category-defying, Abramski case.42
The most recent Term chronicled another first: it is the first Term in
which any Justice on the Roberts Court voted on the winning side of every
criminal justice case. 43 Justice Kennedy’s participation in all twenty-one
majorities that handed down criminal justice rulings during the 2013–2014

37

See infra text accompanying notes 305–317 for a fuller discussion of Abramski.
For summaries of all five-member majority, criminal justice decisions on the
Roberts Court that we identified (none of which ended with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito
in dissent from a conservative outcome). See 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 55–74;
2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 267–80; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 334–42;
2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 273–81; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 30–45; 2007–
2008 Term, supra note 14, at 71–85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1025–42; and 2005–
2006 Term, supra note 14, at 529–45.
39
See supra Table 2.
40
See, e.g., 2012–13 Term, supra note 14, at 40 (showing Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg tied in having the most liberal voting record in criminal justice cases decided that
Term).
41
For examples of those asserting that Sotomayor’s experiences (e.g., a Latina,
growing up in a housing project, prosecutor) have given her a heightened appreciation for the
‘real-world’ consequences of criminal justice decisions and of failures in the criminal justice
system, see Rachel E. Barkow, Justice Sotomayor and Criminal Justice in the Real World,
YALE L.J. FORUM (Mar. 24, 2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-andcriminal-justice-in-the-real-world; Veronica Couzo, Sotomayor’s Empathy Moves the Court a
Step Closer to Equitable Adjudication, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (2013); Linda
Greenhouse, The Roberts Court, Version 4.0, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Oct. 2, 2010, 6:16
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/the-roberts-court-version-4-0/.
42
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).
43
For tables and case summarizes demonstrating that no Justice has been a
member of all criminal justice decisions in previous Terms of the Roberts Court, see; 2012–
2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 247; 2010–2011 Term,
supra note 14, at 327–42; 2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 234; 2008–2009 Term, supra
note 14, at 7; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 50–85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at
1015–42; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 519–45.
38
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Term furthers his reputation as an especially influential member of the high
court.44
Interagreement rates of paired Justices are presented in Tables 3 and
4. Judicial scholars have drawn upon interagreement tables for decades to
reveal shared voting tendencies among Justices and to identify potential
voting blocs.45 Classifying Justices as part of a bloc does not indicate they
trade votes or even consciously seek to vote with one another. Instead,
frequently supporting the same outcome suggests that members of a voting
bloc may share certain judicial philosophies and policy preferences.46
A bloc exists when the average agreement scores for a set of justices
exceeds a threshold known as the Sprague criterion. 47 This criterion is
calculated by subtracting the average agreement score for the entire Court
from one hundred; the result is divided by two and added to the Court
average. That sum is the threshold level for defining a voting bloc. 48 A
notable advantage of the Sprague criterion is that when the general rate of
agreement is high on the Court—such as in 2013–2014 criminal justice
cases49—the calculation raises the threshold which avoids confusing broader
consensus with voting blocs.50

44
See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33; Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns
Supreme on Court: With O’Connor’s Departure, Sole Swing Voter Wields His Moderating
Force, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, A6; Richard Wolf, From gay marriage to voting law,
Kennedy is the key, USA TODAY, (11:31 PM, June 27, 2013) http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-court-athony-kennedy-race-voting-abortion-gaymarriage/2161701/;Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle
Court’s 5 to 4 Decisions Underscore His Power, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, A1.
45
See, e.g., GARRISON NELSON, PATHWAYS TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: FROM
THE ARENA TO THE MONASTERY 171–72 (2013) (noting The Harvard Review’s long history of
using interagreement rates in summarizing Supreme Court Terms).
46
We coded agreement with respect to judgment only. Occasionally, this
approach can overestimate the degree of agreement between Justices. For example, four
Justices dissented in Paroline v. United States. See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710
(2013). While Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented to assert that flaws in the existing law
did not permit victim restitution in that case, Sotomayor dissented alone to argue the victim
was entitled to more than the majority concluded. See infra notes 290–304, and accompanying
text for a fuller discussion of Paroline. For purposes of Tables 3 and 4, however, Sotomayor is
coded as agreeing with the other dissenters, if only in terms of their opposition to the majority
opinion; See, e.g., John M. Scheb II, Colin Glennon, & Hemant Sharma, A Statistical Look at
the Supreme Court’s 2009 Term, 7 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y, 7, 12–15 (2011).
47
JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
CASES IN FEDERALISM, 1889–1959, 7 (1968).
48
Id. at 51–61.
49
See supra Table 1 (providing the percentage of cases ending in a unanimous
decision).
50
Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Comparison of
the Original Vote on the Merits with the Final Vote, 22 JURIMETRICS 287, 289–90 (1982).
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TABLE 3:
Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S. Supreme Court
Criminal Justice Decisions, 2013–2014 Term51

Roberts
Scalia
Thomas
Alito
Kennedy
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan

Scalia

Thomas

Alito

Kennedy

Breyer

Sotomayor

Kagan

Ginsburg

90.5

90.5

85.7

81.0

81.0

76.2

71.4

66.7

90.5

85.7

81.0

71.4

76.2

81.0

76.2

95.2

81.0

71.4

66.7

71.4

66.7

85.7

76.2

61.9

76.2

71.4

90.5

76.2

90.5

85.7

85.7

81.0

85.7

85.7

90.5
95.2

Court mean: 80.4
Sprague criterion: 90.2
Voting blocs:
Roberts-Scalia-Thomas: 90.5
Alito-Thomas-Scalia: 90.5*
Alito-Roberts-Thomas: 90.5*
Ginsburg-Sotomayor-Kagan: 90.5*
Ginsburg-Kagan-Kennedy: 90.5*
(*) denotes that the average agreement of the group meets the threshold
though one interagreement pair within the subset falls a fraction of a case
below the criterion.
______________________________________________________________
Two pairs of Justices (Ginsburg and Kagan; Alito and Thomas) tied
for the highest interagreement rate for the 2013–2014 Term. Members of
each dyad agreed regarding judgment in all but one criminal justice case.52
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Justices with the most liberal (Sotomayor) and
51

Percentages are rounded. Data regard the 21criminal justice cases analyzed in
this Article. Assessments regard majority and dissenting positions relative to the Court’s
judgment only. Positions are not distinguished further by concurring opinions. See infra Part
III.A–D.
52
Kagan was in the majority while Ginsburg dissented in White v. Woodall.
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (concerning sentencing jury instructions regarding a
convicted man’s decision not to testify during the penalty phase of his trial). Alito was in the
majority while Thomas dissented in Paroline v. United States. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1710
(regarding restitution to a victim of child pornography).
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the most conservative voting records (Alito)53 were the most polarized from
an interagreement perspective. However, never before during the Roberts
Court era have two Justices failed to agree on every non-unanimous, criminal
justice decision like Justices Alito and Sotomayor in the 2013–2014 Term.54
The paucity of non-unanimous decisions during the most recent Term 55
cautions against overstating this finding, though Alito and Sotomayor agreed
in only one non-unanimous decision during the 2012–2013 Term when given
far more opportunities.
TABLE 4:
Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S. Supreme Court
Criminal Justice Non-unanimous Decisions, 2013–2014 Term56

Roberts

Scalia

Thomas

Alito

Kennedy

Breyer

Sotomayor

Kagan

Ginsburg

75.0

75.0

62.5

50.0

50.0

37.5

25.0

12.5

75.0

62.5

50.0

25.0

37.5

50.0

37.5

87.5

50.0

25.0

12.5

25.0

12.5

62.5

37.5

0.0

37.5

25.0

75.0

37.5

75.0

62.5

62.5

50.0

62.5

Scalia
Thomas
Alito
Kennedy
Breyer
Sotomayor

62.5

Kagan

75.0
87.5

Court mean: 48.6
Sprague criterion: 74.3
Voting blocs:
Roberts-Scalia-Thomas: 75.0
Alito-Thomas-Scalia: 75.0*
Alito-Roberts-Thomas: 75.0*
Ginsburg-Sotomayor-Kagan: 75.0*
53

See supra Table 2 (showing Alito with the Term’s highest conservative voting
percentage and Sotomayor with the lowest).
54
See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at
250; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 320; 2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 236; 2008–
2009 Term, supra note 14, at 10; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 43–4; 2006–2007 Term,
supra note 14, at 1000–1; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 508.
55
See supra Table 1.
56
Percentages are rounded. Data regard the eight non-unanimous criminal justice
cases analyzed in this Article. Assessments regard majority and dissenting positions relative to
the Court’s judgment only. Positions are not distinguished further by concurring opinions. See
infra Part III.B–D.
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Ginsburg-Kagan-Kennedy: 75.0*
(*) denotes that the average agreement of the group meets the threshold
though one interagreement pair within the subset falls a fraction of a case
below the criterion.
______________________________________________________________
The Term produced evidence of several larger voting blocs. The
ideological wings of the Court are a bit clearer here than in Table 2. Three
different subsets of Justices from the conservative wing of the Court—each
with three members—voted in the same direction with respect to judgment
sufficiently often for each to be considered a voting bloc. 57 Also, for the
second consecutive year, the three women on the Court routinely found
themselves on the same side of criminal justice issues.58
Much more remarkable is Justice Kennedy’s presence in a voting
bloc with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Although Kennedy’s occasional
support for liberal outcomes as a “median” and “swing” Justice are well
documented, he has never before been part of a criminal justice voting bloc
during the Roberts Court era with multiple members of the liberal wing.59
This unique development and other atypical patterns noted previously
underscore the value of examining more closely the Court’s criminal justice
decisions of the 2013–2014 Term.

57
See supra Tables 3 and 4 (indicating the following conservative voting blocs:
Roberts-Scalia-Thomas; Alito-Thomas-Scalia; and Alito-Roberts-Thomas). One four-member
subset including Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito might be considered a near-bloc with a
mean interagreement rate of 89.7 in all criminal justice cases and 72.9 in non-unanimous ones.
58
See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42 (showing that the only bloc of three
or more Justices in criminal justice cases that Term was that of Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan). See also, Fairfield & Liptak, supra note 32 (reporting on all Supreme Court cases and
noting, “In the term that ended in June 2013, the three women on the court—Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan—were tightly bunched on the left side of
the array. They cast liberal votes around 70% of the time.”).
59
See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33, at 40–1 (“. . . there are super
medians—Justices so powerful that they are able to exercise significant control over the
outcome and content of the Court’s decisions. Justice Kennedy was one [in the 2006–2007
Term]. . . .”); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY
ON LIBERTY 4 (2009) (asserting that “there is no escaping the fact that for most of his two
decades on the Supreme Court Kennedy has been the model of a median justice.”); and
Barnes, supra note 44 (quoting Richard Dieter, “So Justice Kennedy is even more of an
important swing vote than he was before”); See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42; 2011–
2012 Term, supra note 14, at 249–50; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 317, 320; 2009–
2010 Term, supra note 14, at 235–36; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 9–10; 2007–2008
Term, supra note 14, at 43–4; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1000–01; and 2005–2006
Term, supra note 14, at 507–08.
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III. CASE DECISIONS
A. Unanimous Decisions
As noted, the Court handed down an unusually large percentage of
criminal justice decisions without dissent during the 2013–2014 Term.60 All
four criminal justice opinions authored by the Chief Justice this Term were
unanimous rulings, as were both opinions written by Justice Sotomayor and
the only criminal justice opinion authored by Justice Breyer.61 We begin with
a discussion of the eight conservative, unanimous rulings.62
The Court’s conservative, unanimous ruling in Burt v. Titlow refused
habeas relief under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).63 In this ineffective assistance of counsel case, the Court held that
federal courts should use the “doubly deferential” standard which gives the
benefit of doubt to defense counsel and to lower court rulings regarding
counsel competence, and advises appellate courts to assume counsel’s
performance was adequate absent indicators otherwise. 64 Here, the Court
held that the federal court should have accepted the state court’s finding that
counsel was not ineffective.65 According to Justice Alito’s majority opinion
(for all Justices except Justice Ginsburg who concurred in judgment),66 the
AEDPA does not permit federal courts to “so casually second-guess the
decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.”67
The Court also made the use of deadly force to stop high speed car
chases easier to justify in Plumhoff v. Rickard, another conservative ruling
authored by Justice Alito.68 Police chased Donald Rickard and his passenger
for several miles. 69 Police attempted to stop Rickard’s car using a rolling
roadblock but were unsuccessful.70 Police pursued Rickard through traffic at
speeds that at times surpassed 100 miles per hour.71 He was nearly cornered
in a parking lot where he continued to attempt escape.72 At that point, police
60

See supra note 22, and accompanying text.
Robers v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854 (2014); United States v. Apel, 134 S.
Ct. 1144 (2014); Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077 (2014); McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2518; Riley, 134 S.
Ct. at 2473; Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596 (2013); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct.
1405 (2014);
62
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012
(2014); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 596; Apel, 134 S. Ct.
at 1144 (2014); Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1405; Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384
(2014); Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1854 (2014).
63
Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 17–8.
64
Id. at 13.
65
Id. at 15–7.
66
Id. at 24 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in judgment).
67
Id. at 13.
68
Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2012 (2014).
69
Id. at 2017.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
61
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exited their cruisers and first fired three shots at Rickard’s car.73 When those
failed to halt Rickard, police fired several more shots, eventually killing both
Rickard and the passenger. 74 Rickard’s surviving daughter brought suit
against the officers and other government officials asserting they had
violated her father’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using
excessive force.75 The officers made a claim of qualified immunity but the
district court refused to grant them summary judgment.76 The district court
and the circuit court found a Fourth Amendment violation and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.77
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito held that the officers did not
violate constitutional protections nor did they violate clearly established
law.78 First, Alito noted that Fourth Amendment excessive force cases are
governed by determining if the police’s actions were excessive given the
totality of the circumstances from the viewpoint of a “reasonable officer on
the scene.”79 Rickard’s daughter argued that the standard was violated twice
because the officers did not have the right to use deadly force to stop the
chase80 and that they used excessive force by firing too many shots at the
car.81 Alito found both arguments unpersuasive. He held that police can use
deadly force to stop a chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders.82
Further, Alito noted that if officers were authorized to use deadly force, the
police do not have to stop until the threat is over.83 Since Rickard at no point
attempted to surrender, the second round of shots were justified. 84 The
presence of a passenger does not change the argument as Alito asserted it
was Rickard and not the police who endangered the passenger. 85 Finally,
regarding the question of qualified immunity, Alito found that the police
would have been entitled to immunity even if the Court had ruled the Fourth
Amendment was violated because the police had not violated clearly
established law.86
The Court also handed down a conservative ruling protecting law
enforcement from suits filed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents by asserting that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the law

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021.
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Id. at 2022.
Id.
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enforcement officer in Walden v. Fiore.87 Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s
opinion.
In Kansas v. Cheever the Court ruled that court-ordered psychiatric
examinations may be used by the state to rebut a defendant’s claim of
intoxication without violating the Fifth Amendment’s protection against selfincrimination. 88 In this case, Scott Cheever shot and killed a local sheriff
following a night in which Cheever cooked and consumed
methamphetamine. 89 Before the case proceeded to trial, Kansas’s death
penalty scheme was deemed unconstitutional by the state high court. 90
Unable to obtain a death sentence for Cheever, the state dismissed the
charges and allowed federal prosecutors to charge Cheever under the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994.91 Because Cheever indicated that he intended to
introduce evidence that he was intoxicated during the commission of the
murder thereby reducing his culpability, the Court ordered Cheever undergo
a psychiatric evaluation consistent with Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.92 Eventually, the federal case was dismissed without prejudice.93
By then, the United States Supreme Court had found Kansas’s death penalty
procedures constitutional; Kansas decided to try Cheever in state court.94
At trial, Cheever introduced expert testimony that his long-term drug
use made him incapable of forming premeditation. 95 The state, in rebuttal
and over defense’s objections, introduced the psychiatric evaluation
conducted during the federal trial. 96 Defense’s objection centered on the
constitutional claim that the evaluation was not voluntary and thus its
introduction violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.97 The trial court allowed the rebuttal testimony, the jury found
Cheever guilty and recommended a death sentence and Cheever appealed.98
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Cheever and United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.99
Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor found that Cheever’s Fifth
Amendments rights had not been violated. Justice Sotomayor noted that the
Court had previously ruled in Estelle v. Smith that court-ordered psychiatric
evaluations could not be used against a defendant when the defendant did not

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Walden, 403 U.S. 388.
Cheever, 134 S. Ct at 603.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 599.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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initiate the evaluation or introduce psychiatric evidence herself.100 However,
the Court clarified in Buchanan v. Kentucky that this type of testimony could
be used as rebuttal evidence when the defendant introduced testimony related
to a mental capacity defense. 101 Reaffirming the ruling in Buchanan, the
Court found the state may rebut a defendant’s mental state defense using
court-ordered evaluations.102
The Court also handed down a conservative ruling in United States
v. Apel.103 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that for
the purposes of federal law, individuals barred from military installments are
barred from all areas under the commanding officers’ area of responsibility,
including those designated free speech protest areas and parts of highways.104
When defense counsel and noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
attempted to focus on First Amendment claims during oral argument, the
Justices appeared more interested in the property ownership aspect of the
case.105
In United States v. Castleman the Court further defined the meaning
of the words “physical force” in a unanimous, conservative ruling written by
Justice Sotomayor. 106 Federal law holds that anyone convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is barred from obtaining or
engaging in commercial activity related to fire arms and ammunition.107 A
misdemeanor domestic violence offense is defined as one that “has, as an
element, the use or attempted use of physical force.” 108 James Castleman
pleaded guilty to the state charge of “intentionally or knowingly causeing
bodily injury to” the mother of his child.109 Years later, he was indicted by
the federal government for trafficking weapons; he was charged with
possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.110 Castleman argued that the federal law did not apply to
him because his state crime did not involve physical force and, thus, was not
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law. 111 Justice
Sotomayor held that absent any other indications, Congress intended to use
the common-law meaning of “force.”112 The common-law definition includes

100

Cheevers,134 S. Ct. at 600 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
Id. at 601 (citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423-24 (1987)).
102
Id. at 602–03.
103
Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 1144 (2014).
104
Id. at 1153.
105
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Dismissing Speech Claims, Justices Turn to Plain LineDrawing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, at A20.
106
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1405.
107
Id. at 1409.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410.
101
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offensive touching and, under this definition of physical force, Castleman’s
state conviction qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.113
In Loughrin v. United States, a decision written by Justice Kagan,
the Court ruled that the federal bank fraud statute did not require the
government to prove the defendant intended to defraud a financial
institution.114 Rather, a showing that the defendant intentionally engaged in
criminal conduct to obtain property under control of the bank was sufficient
to support the conviction.115
In the final conservative criminal justice decision without dissent
during the 2013–2014 Term, the Court clarified in Robers v. United States
the obligations of convicted criminals under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). 116 In this case, Benjamin Robers
committed mortgage fraud by misrepresenting his income and intent to repay
loans. He obtained approximately $470,000 worth of loans from banks, and
when he failed to make the loan payments, the banks foreclosed and
eventually sold the properties for about $280,000.117 When Robers failed to
make the loan payments, the banks foreclosed and eventually sold the
properties for about $280,000.118 Robers was ordered to pay restitution of
about $220,000, the difference between the original loans and the sales prices
minus fees.119 Robers appealed the restitution amount, arguing that when the
banks foreclosed, part of their property was returned and, according to
statute, the fair market value of the properties—which was higher than the
amount for which the houses sold—should have been used to calculate
restitution.120 In a decision written by Justice Breyer, the Court disagreed and
held that the banks’ property in this regard was the loan amount rather than
the collateral; thus, the actual sale prices should be used to calculate the
restitution amount and not the market value of the homes at the time of
foreclosure.121
The Court handed down five unanimous, liberal decisions in
criminal justice cases during the 2013–2014 Term. Interestingly, members of
the Court’s conservative wing authored all five of these liberal decisions.122
In an important liberal ruling that law professor Jeffrey Rosen called
“a landmark decision translating the Fourth Amendment into a digital
113

Id. at 1413.
Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 2389–90.
115
Id. at 2390–91.
116
Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1854.
117
Id. at 1856.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1857.
121
Id. at 1858–59.
122
Chief Justice Roberts authored Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077; McCullen, 134 S. Ct.
2518; and Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Burrage v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014); and Justice Thomas authored the Court’s decision in Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
114
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age,” 123 the Court ruled in Riley v. California that cell phones cannot be
viewed by police under the incident to a valid arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. 124 David Riley was arrested for possession of concealed
weapons after being stopped for driving with expired registration tags. 125
During a search incident to the arrest, officers seized Riley’s smart phone.126
A police officer specializing in gangs found information on the phone
implicating Riley in gang activity. 127 Based on this evidence, police filed
additional charges regarding an earlier gang related shooting and other
weapons charges. 128 Riley moved to suppress the evidence from the cell
phone, holding that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because
the search was not justified by exigent circumstances. 129 Since the crimes
were allegedly committed while involved in gang activity, the government
sought and received an enhanced sentence.130
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s unanimous ruling and held
the searches were invalid under the Fourth Amendment.131 Searches without
a warrant must stem from one of the specific exceptions established by the
Court. Here, the searches were conducted using the incident to a valid arrest
exception.132
But, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, searches incident to a valid arrest
are predicated on either a need to ensure officer safety or to ensure that
evidence will not be destroyed.133 As a result, searches incident to a valid
arrest are limited by spatial considerations; officers may search a person and
items within the person’s reach to both secure evidence and ensure safety. 134
Chief Justice Roberts also noted that the Court later added that the
reasonableness of searches of a person incident to an arrest was not

123
How the Supreme Court Changed America This Year, POLITICO MAG., July 1,
2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-ame
rica-this-year-108497.html#.U-fF3D8qv9o (Last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
124
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. Riley v. California was decided together with United
States v. Wurie, No. 13-212.
125
Id. at 2480.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2481.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
131
In the companion case, Brima Wurie was arrested after officers observed what
appeared to be a drug transaction. Upon arrest, officers seized two cell phones. One of those
phones, a flip phone, received several phone calls from a location that was identified as “my
house.” The police traced the number to an apartment, obtained a warrant, and eventually
seized illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, a weapon, and money. Wurie moved to suppress the
evidence from his apartment arguing that the evidence resulted from an illegal search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Both Riley and Wurie lost, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases. Riley,134 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
132
Id. at 2482.
133
Id. at 2483
134
Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
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dependent on the probability of finding evidence or weapons.135 Finishing his
review of relevant precedents, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Court’s
2009 decision in Arizona v. Gant recognized that the incident to an arrest
exception allowed police to search cars “only when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search.”136 However, the attributes of car searches permitted the search of
vehicles’ passenger compartments when it was reasonable to believe that
evidence of the offense leading to the arrest might be discovered in the
vehicle.137
Applying these concepts to the search of a cell phone, Chief Justice
Roberts recognized that cell phones are a pervasive part of American life and
that that these technologies were “inconceivable” when the prior cases were
decided.138 He and the Court refused to extend the Robinson decision to cell
phones because cell phones contain an incredible amount of personal
information and searches of them do not resemble the less intrusive physical
searches justified in Robinson.139 Using Chimel, the Court noted further that
obtaining information from cell phones does not aid in ensuring officer
safety, and that preventing the destruction of evidence was an unpersuasive
justification because once the cell phone is in police custody, the defendant
cannot remove information from the phone. 140 Finally, the Gant standard
does not apply because the reduced expectation of privacy and increased
needs of law enforcement regarding vehicles do not match the cell phone
context.141
The Chief Justice and the Court also noted that substantial privacy
interests are jeopardized when cell phones are searched given the amount of
personal information such phones often contain.142 The unanimous decision
required police in these instances, generally, to obtain a warrant before
accessing the information on a cell phone.143
In another unanimous, liberal decision authored by Chief Justice
Roberts, the Court upheld rights under the First Amendment in McCullen v.
Coakley. 144 The case deals with enforcement of a Massachusetts law that
made it illegal to stand within thirty-five feet of any location where abortions
are performed, other than hospitals. 145 The law contained exceptions for
135

(1973)).

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483–84 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218

136

Id. at 2484 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 2485.
140
Id. at 2485–86.
141
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
142
Id. at 2490.
143
Id. at 2493. The Court made no distinction between the relatively simple flip
phone used by Wurie and the more advanced smart phone used by Riley.
144
McCullen,134 S. Ct. at 2518.
145
Id. at 2526.
137
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those with business within the location, but otherwise created a strict buffer
zone. 146 Here, Eleanor McCullen, a “sidewalk counselor,” stood outside
abortion clinics and offered those entering information regarding alternatives
to abortion. McCullen argued that direct eye contact is necessary to make
these encounters effective and the Massachusetts law significantly restricted
her ability to counsel.147 Other sidewalk counselors made similar arguments
and sued the state in 2008, arguing that the statute violated their First
Amendment right to free speech.148
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that public
spaces have long been regarded as areas available for the free discussion of
ideas. 149 As such, the government’s ability to limit speech on the public
walkways is limited.150 Although the government can regulate the time, place
and manner of speech, laws restricting speech must be content neutral and
narrowly tailored to meet significant government interest.151
Addressing first the neutrality of the law, Chief Justice Roberts held
that the law is content neutral and thus did not need to be evaluated using the
strict scrutiny standard.152 However, Chief Justice Roberts found the law was
not narrowly tailored to meet significant government objectives.153 The law
forced street counselors to stand far away from their intended subjects,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of their message.154 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the law “burden[s] substantially more speech than necessary
to achieve the Commonwealth’s asserted interests” of maintaining public
safety.155
In another case raising First Amendment issues, the Court’s ruling in
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus held that an interest group could sue to
enjoin enforcement of an Ohio law making it a crime to present certain false
statements during an election before the group was prosecuted for violating
the law. 156 Here, an organization called the Susan B. Anthony List
characterized an Ohio congressman’s support for the Affordable Care Act as
support for abortions funded at taxpayer expense.157 The congressman, Steve
Driehaus, filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, asserting
that the Anthony group had violated the Ohio law by making false
statements.158
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
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Driehaus lost his reelection bid and dropped the complaint, but
Susan B. Anthony List filed suit in federal court arguing that the Ohio law
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by criminalizing speech.159
Once the complaint by Driehaus was dismissed, Susan B. Anthony List
amended the suit alleging that the Ohio law was unconstitutional as it had an
impermissible and unconstitutional chilling effect on their rights to free
speech, especially given the group’s intention to continue to make similar
statements about other politicians in the future.160
The lower federal courts, consolidating this case with another from
the Coalition Opposed to Additional Taxing and Spending, held that the
litigants failed to show actual harm for the purposes of standing and
determinations of ripeness, and as a result, found the cases were not
justiciable.161
Justice Thomas—writing for a unanimous Court—reversed, and held
that the litigants had shown sufficiently that the threat of prosecution
impacted their behavior.162 Although the Court did not resolve the central
question dealing with the constitutionality of criminalizing false statements
during an election cycle, the ability of both groups to sue should ensure that
this issue is addressed by the lower courts.
In Burrage v. United States, the Court considered mandatoryminimum sentences under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Joshua
Banka died of a drug overdose after binging on multiple drugs, including
heroin purchased from Marcus Burrage.163 Although the medical examiners
could not determine if Banka would have lived but for the fact that he took
heroin, and despite the determination that Banka died from “mixed-drug
intoxication,” Burrage was sentenced to twenty years in prison for selling
heroin to Banka under the CSA. 164 Although the defense argued that the
government had to show that the heroin was “but-for cause of death,” the
trial court held instead that the government merely had to show that the
heroin was a contributing factor to Banka’s death.165
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that Burrage could not be
held liable for enhanced sentencing unless the heroin was the cause of
Banka’s death. 166 Since the medical experts could not determine if death
would not have resulted without the heroin, the sentence enhancement did
not apply. Also, Justice Scalia held that the jury must decide if the victim’s
death was a foreseeable result of Burrage’s drug dealing.167 Justice Scalia
held that based on past decisions, all findings that increase the mandatory
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 2340.
Id.
Id. at 2340–41.
Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2343–46.
Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881 at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 892.
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minimum sentences to which defendants are exposed must be submitted to a
jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.168
In perhaps the most awaited criminal justice decision of the term,
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s ruling in Bond v. United
States. 169 Although all nine Justices voted to overturn Bond’s conviction,
three did so based on constitutional grounds far removed from the statutory
arguments used by remaining six Court members. This has prompted some to
classify the decision as unanimous while others characterize it as a six-tothree vote.170 We list this as a unanimous liberal decision given that all nine
Justices ruled in Bond’s favor.
In 1997, the President signed and the Senate ratified the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-piling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. 171 This treaty was not selfexecuting and required congressional legislation to implement. In 1998,
Congress passed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
which prohibited any individual from knowingly using, developing or
acquiring chemical weapons. 172 The Implementation Act defined chemical
weapons broadly as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals . . .” when used for something other than peaceful
purposes.173
The case began in 2006 when Carol Ann Bond discovered that her
husband and her best friend, Myrlinda Haynes, were having an affair that
resulted in a pregnancy.174 Bond decided to get revenge by placing chemical
irritants on Haynes’s car door, mailbox and door knob. 175 Although the
chemicals used could be deadly, Bond’s undisputed intent was to cause
Haynes discomfort.176 Haynes, however, saw the substance in each instance
but one and avoided contact.177 On the one occasion that Haynes touched the
irritant, she suffered a minor thumb burn which she treated by washing her
hands.178 Although the local police failed to respond to Haynes complaints,
federal postal inspectors placed surveillance cameras around Haynes’s home
168

Id. at 887 (citing Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
169
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077.
170
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT
COLLEGE OF LAW. http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_158 (treating the
decision as six-to-three) (last visited Aug.10, 2014); Bond v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG.
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/bond-v-united-states-2/ (classifying the decision
as unanimous) (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
171
Bond, 134 S.Ct. at 2083.
172
Id.
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Id. at 2085.
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Id.
175
Id.
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Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083.
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Id. at 2085.
178
Id.
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and caught Bond placing the chemicals on Haynes’s mail and inside her car’s
muffler.179 The federal government charged Bond with mail theft and with a
violation of the federal Chemical Weapons Ban treaty through the
Implementation Act. Bond pleaded guilty after reserving her ability to
challenge the constitutionality of her arrest under the Implementation Act.180
On appeal, Bond argued that the Implementation Act violated the 10th
Amendment by encroaching on states’ rights.181 She furthered argued that
her conduct was not covered under the treaty because the treaty intended to
cover “warlike” activities and not the criminal conduct exhibited here.182 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her arguments and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.183
Writing for Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts avoided the constitutional questions
surrounding Congress’s ability to implement non self-executing treaties on
its domestic population by instead resolving the conflict on statutory
grounds.184 When acts intended to implement treaties are passed, those acts
must conform with the scheme of federalism the Constitution establishes. In
order to assume that Congress intended to reach purely local crimes and
interfere with the states’ policing powers, there must be clear indication of
that intent within the statute. Finding none, Roberts concluded that Congress
did not intend to cover local crimes.185
Further, Roberts noted that a fair reading of the Implementation Act
indicated it is not as broad as prosecutors in this case asserted. Rather,
Roberts noted there is a large difference between using a chemical weapon
and using a “chemical in a way that caused some harm.”186 When taken in
that light, the chemicals used here, while certainly used to cause harm, were
not used in a situation that most would consider chemical warfare and, as
such, were not covered by the Implementation Act. 187 Nor would the
spreading of chemical irritants on a mailbox, with the intent to cause a rash,
be considered a warlike activity conducted during “combat.”188 Although use
of the same chemicals to poison the city’s water would be considered a
chemical weapons attack and thus could be prosecuted using the
Implementation Act, Bond’s situation is so far removed from this scenario
179

Id.
Id. at 2085–6.
181
Id. at 2086.
182
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086.
183
Id. This was the second time the Court granted certiorari regarding these
events. The Court previously ruled in 2011 that individuals and not just states have standing to
raise Tenth Amendment challenges to federal law. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. _____
(2011).
184
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
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that to using the Implementation Act to cover her conduct exceeds
congressional intent.189
Chief Justice Roberts further rejected the government’s
interpretation of what constitutes chemical weapons. Roberts noted that the
government’s definition would render “everything from the detergent under
the kitchen sink to the stain remover in the laundry room” chemical
weapons. 190 This broad reading is not consistent with what the average
person considers to constitute a chemical weapon.191
In short, Roberts’s decision relied a great deal on a ‘I-know-it-whenI-see-it’ type of analysis holding that the average person understands
chemical weapons to cover, for instance, the use of mustard gas on enemy
troops or on a domestic population for the purposes of terrorism, but would
not recognize Bond’s behavior as anything more than “an act of revenge
born of romantic jealousy.” 192 By ruling that the prosecution of Bond
exceeded the scope of the Implementation Act as intended by Congress,
Roberts and the majority overturned Bond’s conviction while avoiding the
controversial issues related to federalism and Congress’s treaty powers.193
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice
Thomas and in part by Justice Alito.194 Scalia agreed with the majority that
Bond’s conviction must be overturned, but based his argument instead on
constitutional grounds holding that Congress exceeded its authority by
passing the Implementation Act in the first place. 195 Scalia began by
asserting that Bond’s behavior was covered by the Implementation Act.
Bond used chemicals for non-peaceful purposes with the intent to cause
injury, satisfying the mandates of the Act.196 Because the Act covers Bond’s
actions, the question the Court should have addressed is whether Congress
has the ability to pass sweeping legislation that provides the legislature with
the type of policing powers generally reserved to the states, and then apply
legislation to local criminal activity.197
After mocking the majority’s interpretation of the Implementation
Act as not covering Bond’s actions, Scalia turned to the constitutional issue.
Here, Scalia took issue with Court’s 1920 ruling in Missouri v. Holland198
that held the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass
legislation to implement valid treaties.199 Holland’s landmark ruling could be
interpreted as providing Congress enormous power to implement
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
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international treaties in the domestic sphere. For example, “By negotiating a
treaty and obtaining the requisite consent of the Senate, the President…may
endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of the
powers enumerated in Article I.”200
Scalia found fault with such a conceptualization. Instead, Scalia
argued that Congress has the ability to make all laws necessary and proper
for making treaties but, because treaty implementation in not one of
Congress’s enumerated powers, not for executing them. 201 The power to
make treaties is not synonymous with the power to implement those treaties
and the use of Holland, according to Scalia, to treat the two activities as both
falling under Congress’s implied powers conflicts with constitutional limits
on federal authority. 202
Justice Scalia warned that if the treaty making power were not
limited based on its subject matter, Congress would be able to regulate
citizens’ activities through treaty implementation by obtaining policing
powers generally left to the states. 203 For example, if Congress wanted to
again ban the possession of guns near schools—something the Court ruled in
United States v. Lopez was beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce
Clause—a treaty could be ratified with another nation establishing that
neither nation would allow the bringing of weapons to a school.204 Congress
then could pass a law implementing that treaty and circumvent Lopez. 205
Seeing this type of congressional activity as a violation of the principles of
federalism, Justice Scalia found the use of the Implementation Act against
Bond to be unconstitutional.206
Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in judgment that
was joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part by Justice Alito.207 Justice
Thomas wrote separately to express his view “that the Treaty Power is itself
a limited federal power” in addition to limits on Congress’s authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.208 Justice Thomas closes by emphasizing
the need for the Court to address the bounds of the Treaty Power given the
appropriate case, and seems to signal to interested parties his willingness to
take up this task if the issue is brought to the Court.209
Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in judgment also asserted that the
issue in this case regarded the constitutionality of the Implementation Act.210
Justice Alito maintained that any reading of the Convention that “obligate[s]
200
201
202
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204
205
206
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208
209
210
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the United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing conduct of the
sort at issue in this case, which typically is the sort of conduct regulated by
the States . . . exceeds the scope of the treaty power.” 211 Thus, all three
Justices concurring in judgment would reverse Bond’s conviction but would
do so based on constitutional grounds rather than on a reading of statutory
intent.
B. Seven-to-Two Decision
The 2013–2014 Term marked the first Term during the Roberts
Court era in which no criminal justice case was decided with a single
dissent,212 and for the first time since the 2006–2007 Term, only one ended
in a seven-to-two vote.213 In the sole criminal justice case decided seven-totwo this Term, the outcome favored the criminally convicted.
Specifically, the Court’s ruling in Rosemond v. United States214 held
that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the crime of aiding
and abetting. Justus Rosemond and one other male and a female were
involved in a drug deal during which either Rosemond or the other male fired
a weapon. 215 Because the identity of the shooter was in dispute, the
government charged Rosemond both with using a gun in the commission of a
drug crime and with aiding and abetting the use of a gun during a drug
offense. 216 The trial court judge instructed the jury that they could find
Rosemond guilty of aiding and abetting if “(1) the defendant knew his cohort
used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and (2) the defendant knowingly
and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime.”217 The jury convicted
using these instructions and Rosemond appealed.218
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kagan and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and
Sotomayor in full, and by Justice Scalia in part, held that the jury instructions
were faulty. 219 The Court noted that a defendant must have advance
knowledge that an accomplice carried a firearm to the planned illegal
activity.220 Without that finding, the defendant cannot have knowingly aided
the use of a firearm. The Court’s decision provides a much needed
211
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clarification of the law of aiding and abetting given the conflicting
interpretations among the circuit courts. 221 Here, the jury’s verdict was
vacated and the case remanded.222
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Although Alito agreed with much of the
Court’s analysis, he disagreed with the notion that the burden of proof falls
with the government to show that the defendant had prior knowledge of the
presence of a firearm at the crime.223
C. Six-to-Three Decisions
The Court handed down three decisions ending in a six-to-three vote
during the 2013–2014 Term.224 All three resulted in a conservative outcome
from which Justice Sotomayor dissented.
The Court held in Kaley v. United States that when assets have been
seized before trial in response to a grand jury’s indictment, defendants do not
have the right to contest the grand jury’s probable cause determination. 225
The defendants were accused of selling stolen medical equipment. Based on
a grand jury’s indictment, the government seized the defendants’ assets,
including those intended to be used to pay legal fees. 226 Defendants
challenged the seizure and attempted to re-litigate the probable cause
determination by the grand jury. 227 Writing for Justices Thomas, Scalia,
Alito, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, Justice Kagan found they had no right to do
so.228
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor,
dissented,229 arguing that defendants have the right to challenge forfeiture,
especially where those funds are intended to pay for legal counsel.230 Roberts
wrote that the assistance of counsel, “In many ways…is the most precious
right a defendant has, because it is his attorney who will fight for the other
rights the defendant enjoys.”231 This marks the first criminal justice case in
which Chief Justice Roberts dissented when all of his fellow conservative
colleagues (Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Kennedy) were in the
majority.232
221
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White v. Woodall also resulted in a conservative, six-to-three
ruling. 233 The case addressed Fifth Amendment protections against selfincrimination during the penalty phase of a capital case.
Robert Woodall raped and killed a teenage girl. 234 Faced with
considerable evidence of his guilt, Woodall pleaded guilty to the charges and
proceeded to sentencing. 235 Woodall produced witnesses arguing for
mitigation but he did not testify during the sentencing phase of the trial.236
He then requested jury instructions indicating that the jury should not draw
negative inferences from his failure to testify.237 The trial court judge denied
the request and Woodall eventually filed for federal habeas relief arguing
that failure to give the jury instructions regarding his lack of testimony
violated his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.238
Justice Scalia, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito,
Thomas, Kennedy, and Kagan, found no Fifth Amendment violation. Rather,
Scalia noted that just because a defendant is entitled to no-adverse-inference
jury instructions during the guilt phase of a trial, there is no such entitlement
during the penalty phase. 239 The Sixth Circuit’s ruling that the Fifth
Amendment had been violated was unjustified because the state court had
not operated against clearly established federal law because the Court
previously had not addressed directly the question here.240
Justice Breyer wrote for Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in
dissent. 241 Breyer asserted that the Court’s rulings that a no-adverseinference instruction is necessary at the penalty phase of a trial were welldefined and, consequently, the state court had violated clearly established
federal law.242
In another conservative ruling prompting three dissenting votes, the
Court refused to extend its holding in Georgia v. Randolph and allowed the
search of a tenant’s home over the prior objections of another tenant who
was not physically present during the search. 243 In the case of Fernandez v.
California,244 Walter Fernandez was suspected of being involved in a gangrelated robbery.245 Police were informed that one of the suspects (Fernandez)
had run into an apartment and a few minutes later police heard screaming
Danforth, Justice Kennedy joined Roberts’s dissent. 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (Roberts, J.
dissenting).
233
White, 134 S. Ct. at 1697.
234
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from that apartment. 246 Police found Roxanne Rojas inside the apartment.
Police asked Rojas, who appeared to have been recently in a fight, to step
outside so they could conduct a protective sweep and found Fernandez in the
residence. 247 Fernandez refused police entry but police arrested him on
suspicion of a domestic assault, and he was later identified as a member of
the gang robbery. 248 About an hour after Fernandez’s arrest and removal
from the home, police returned to Rojas’ and Fernandez’s home, informed
Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested and asked to search the apartment.249
Police received both written and verbal consent from Rojas250 and the search
produced evidence implicating Fernandez in the robbery. 251 Fernandez
moved to suppress the evidence but was unsuccessful; he was found guilty
on several charges and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.252 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a co-tenant’s physical
presence is necessary to deny consent to search. 253
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito noted that generally, consent
searches are permissible when one tenant of a jointly occupied property
provides consent. 254 However, in Randolph, the Court crafted a narrow
exception to this rule, holding that “a physically present inhabitant’s express
refusal of consent to a police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him,
regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”255 That is, when a co-tenant
refuses police consent, that refusal is controlling and police may not search
regardless of consent provided by other occupants. Alito noted, however, that
the Randolph ruling dealt with a physically present tenant. 256 Here,
Fernandez was not present when the police received consent to search from
Rojas. The majority found that although Fernandez had objected earlier, his
lack of physical presence during the time of the second entry into his home
makes his prior denial of consent irrelevant.257 Rather, Randolph only applies
as an exception to a consent search when the objecting party is physically
present. Given that Fernandez had already been arrested and removed from
the apartment and police obtained permission from Rojas, the search was
valid under the Fourth Amendment.258

246

Id.
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Fernandez, 134 S.Ct. at 1130.
251
Id. at 1131.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
255
Id. at 1133 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23) (alteration in original)
(italics omitted).
256
Id. at 1133–34.
257
Id. at 1134.
258
Id. at 1137.
247
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Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.259 Ginsburg argued the Fourth Amendment
was violated and that the case should have been viewed as nothing more than
an application of Randolph.260 A faithful application would have resulted in
the search being overturned. Ginsburg argued that the ruling significantly
reduced the value of the exception provided in Randolph.261
D. Five-to-Four Decisions
Marginally-winning coalitions decided four criminal justice cases
during the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013–2014 Term.262 Despite three of these
producing conservative outcomes, Justice Scalia was in the minority in all of
four cases ending in five-member majorities. 263 As will be shown, Scalia’s
dissents, in part, reveal how certain issue areas can lead some Justices to
depart from their normal voting patterns and the care required in interpreting
decisions as being either liberal or conservative.
The Court’s ruling in Navarette v. California dealt with the
reliability of an anonymous tip and law enforcement’s ability to conduct
investigative stops based on such a tip.264 An anonymous caller informed a
911 operator that a driver of a truck had just run her off the road.265 She
provided the operator with the make and model of the truck, the license plate
number, the vehicle’s direction and approximate location.266 Based on that
information, California Highway Police a few minutes later stopped a truck
fitting that profile. 267 As they approached the truck, police smelled
marijuana, conducted an investigative search and found thirty pounds of
marijuana. 268 Defendants Lorenzo and Josa Navarette moved to have the
evidence suppressed arguing that police did not have reasonable suspicion to
conduct the investigative stop because the stop was based on nothing more
259

Id. at 1138 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Fernandez is one of only two criminal
justice cases this Term in which Justice Kagan was not in the majority; the other was
Navarette v. California. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). Justice Breyer was
also in 19 of the 21 majorities analyzed in this Article. However, Breyer dissented in different
cases than did Kagan. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); White, 134 S. Ct.
1697 (2014). This explains why, despite the high rate of majority participation by both Kagan
and Breyer, the interagreement rate between these two Justices is only about average for the
Court in non-unanimous cases decided during the 2013–2014 Term. See supra, Table 4).
260
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1139.
261
Id. at 1141–42.
262
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; Paroline, 134 S.
Ct. at 1710; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986.
263
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; Paroline, 134 S.
Ct. at 1710.
264
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683.
265
Id. at 1686–87.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 1687.
268
Id.
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than an anonymous tip without collaboration.269 The trial court disagreed, the
Navarettes pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and their case eventually
reached the high court on appeal.270
Justice Thomas, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Alito and Breyer, found the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.271 The Court held that the tip was sufficiently collaborated to
justify the stop. 272 The tip specified the make and model of the car and
provided first hand eyewitness testimony of wrongdoing. 273 Further, the
tipster had information regarding a potentially dangerous driver which this
context lent further credence to the tip’s reliability.274 Based on the totality of
the circumstances the tip was sufficiently collaborated; consequently, the
brief investigative stop was justified and constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.275
Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan,
filed a dissent.276 Scalia noted that the Court had, in prior cases, required that
evidence from anonymous tips be collaborated before being used as the basis
of a search.277 Here, the tip was anonymous reducing its credibility.278 Scalia
wrote that the tipster had “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or embellish,” such
that the information did not rise to the level of common exceptions to the
hearsay rule that permit an assumption of greater credibility to certain
statements.279 Scalia maintained that through this decision, the Court created
a new rule regarding anonymous tips that essentially holds that “an
anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated highway
driver provides without more the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a
stop.”280
In a complicated series of votes in Paroline v. United States, the
Court held in a five-to-four conservative decision that victims of child
pornography are entitled to restitution under the Violence Against Women
Act from individuals who possess the pornographic images.281 However, the
Court also held that individuals who possess the pornographic images cannot
be held liable for the entire amount of the victim’s losses but are only

269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Id.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
Id. at 1685.
Id. at 1688–99.
Id.
Id. at 1689.
Id. at 1692.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1693–94.
Id. at 1692.
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1710.
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required to pay restitution in proportion to his or her contributions to the
victim’s losses.282
Here, Doyle Paroline was arrested for having images of child
pornography on his computer. Of the 150 to 300 images on his computer,
two images were of the victim “Amy.”283 Amy had been sexually abused as a
child by her uncle, and her images were put on the internet and widely
circulated.284 Although there was, of course, no clear indication of how many
of these images existed, Court documents indicated that Paroline was one of
thousands of perpetrators who had pictures of the victim.285 Amy filed for
restitution under the Violence Against Women Act and was awarded $3.4
million by the lower courts; those courts held that Paroline was liable for
Amy’s entire loss.286 Paroline appealed and the Court granted certiorari.287
Writing for Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan and Alito, Justice
Kennedy held that, although Paroline was liable for some of Amy’s losses,
he was liable only for those caused by his individual behavior.288 Victims
could thus collect damages from all those convicted of having the
pornographic images. As Kennedy wrote, “it makes sense to spread payment
among a larger number of offenders in amounts more closely in proportion to
their respective causal roles and their own circumstances . . . .”289 Kennedy
also stated that “[t]his would serve the twin goals of helping the victim
achieve eventual restitution for all her child-pornography losses and
impressing upon offenders the fact that child pornography crimes, even
simple possession, affect real victims.” 290 Through the ruling, the Court
upheld the general concept that victims of child pornography could obtain
monetary damages, but adopted a moderate approach towards determining
damages for any particular perpetrator. 291
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, argued that the congressional statute authorizing restitution is
flawed and as written does not allow for victims of child pornography to
collect damages from those who possess the images.292 Rather, Chief Justice
Roberts stated that while he agreed with the majority that child pornography
victims should be able to receive monetary damages, he asserted the statute
is poorly written to address the types of qualitative harm suffered by Amy

282

Id. at 1727.
Id. at 1717–18.
284
Id. at 1717.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 1718.
287
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1718.
288
Id. at 1720.
289
Id. at 1729.
290
Id. at 1727.
291
Because this aspect of the ruling permits at least some restitution potentially
from each identified perpetrator, we code the decision as conservative.
292
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1730 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
283
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from multiple offenders. 293 Justices Roberts, Scalia and Thomas proposed
giving Congress the opportunity to correct the law.294
Justice Sotomayor dissented but for very different reasons than did
the others.295 Arguing that Congress intended the perpetrators to be liable for
the full amount of the victim’s losses, Sotomayor would have upheld the
entire $3.4 million verdict against Paroline.296
The Court’s conservative decision in favor of gun regulation in
Abramski v. United States 297 again highlights the occasional difficulty
encountered when classifying Supreme Court cases as either liberal or
conservative. Because the decision in Abramski supports the government’s
position and is rights-restrictive, it is conservative as defined here. However,
in the broader political context, increasing the effectiveness of gun
regulations is considered a liberal position. This inconsistency explains why
Abramski is the first criminal justice decision in which Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas, Alito and Scalia dissented from a conservative
outcome.298
In this case, Bruce Abramski offered to purchase a gun for his uncle
and entered into an agreement, complete with prepayment, to do so.299 He
then went to a federally licensed firearm dealer, filled out paperwork as the
actual buyer of the gun, signed a statement acknowledging his understanding
that lying on the federal paperwork was a federal crime, passed the
background check, took possession of the weapon and then transferred the
weapon to his uncle.300 Abramski was indicted for falsely asserting that he
was the buyer of the weapon. Abramski eventually pleaded guilty but
preserved his right to appeal. 301 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if straw purchases of weapons are permissible and to determine if
the actual buyer of the weapon was Abramski or the intended owner,
Abramski’s uncle.302
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan noted that the federal
government has for 40 years regulated the sale of firearms to ensure that
individuals who are ineligible to own weapons, like those with mental illness
or drug addiction, do not obtain them.303 Kagan noted that allowing straw
293

Id. at 1732–33.
Id. at 1735.
295
Id. at 1735 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
296
Id. In this sense, Sotomayor took the most conservative position on the Court in
this case by supporting the largest penalty. However, given the coding scheme, her vote
against a conservative decision is categorized as liberal.
297
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259.
298
See supra note 46.
299
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2264–65.
300
Id. at 2265.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Id. at 2261–63. Justice Kagan, the most recent addition to the Court, has slowly
increased her production of majority opinion authorship in non-unanimous criminal justice
cases. During the 2013–2014 Term, she authored three such opinions—Rosemond v. United
294
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purchases of weapons would render those firearm protections meaningless; if
a convicted felon, for instance, could obtain a weapon simply by getting
someone else to purchase it for him, the ability of the federal government to
keep weapons out of the hands of undesirables would be limited
needlessly.304 Therefore, the entire law, taken in context, must be understood
to mean that the “actual buyer” of the weapon was the uncle and not
Abramski.305 Therefore, Abramski falsely stated that he was a buyer and in
so doing, violated federal law.
Although Abramski’s uncle was eligible to purchase the gun, this
fact was irrelevant because, as Kagan noted, those eligible to own weapons
may still use a straw buyer to ensure that the weapon is not traced back to
them if they are planning criminal activity.306 Justice Kagan’s opinion was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. In dissent,
Justice Scalia, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito, argued that the plain meaning of the words indicate that Abramski was
the buyer of the gun.307 Scalia maintained that the falsification by Abramski
was not a fact material to the lawfulness of the purchase of the firearm
because Abramski’s uncle was legally eligible to purchase the weapon.308
The Term’s lone liberal, criminal justice decision decided five-tofour was Hall v. Florida, 309 which again revealed Justice Kennedy’s
importance in death penalty cases.310 In Hall, Kennedy provided a critical,
swing vote necessary for a liberal outcome.311
Hall addressed the implementation of the Court’s ruling in Atkins v.
Virginia 312 which prohibited as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments the execution of those deemed to be developmentally
disabled 313 but left to states to define that threshold. The issue in Hall

States, Kaley v. United States, and Abramski v. United States. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1240;
Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1090; Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259. During the 2012–2013 Term, Kagan
wrote only two non-unanimous criminal justice opinions. See 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14,
at 40. And she authored only a single such opinion during the preceding Term. See 2011–2012
Term supra note 14, at 247).
304
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2267–68.
305
Id. at 2272.
306
Id. at 2268–69.
307
Id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308
Id. at 2275–76.
309
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986.
310
See, e.g., Christopher Dunn, Justice Kennedy: The Man in Control of the Death
Penalty, 238 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2007); Barnes, supra note 58; Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of
Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases,
44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 229 (2013).
311
All four remaining conservative Justices dissented in this case. Hall, 134 S. Ct.
at 2001 (Alito, J. dissenting).
312
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
313
In Atkins the Court used the phrase “mental retardation” to describe those with
significantly subpar intellectual abilities. The language has changed and the Court uses the
new descriptor “intellectual disability” instead. We remain consistent with the Court’s new
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concerned the process by which Florida determined whether or not an
individual’s developmental disability met the threshold for exclusion from
death penalty eligibility.
Florida law required that an individual score a 70 or lower on a
standard IQ test—where 100 is considered average and a score of 70 falls
about two standard deviations below this mean—in order to be considered
developmentally disabled to an extent that made the individual ineligible for
capital punishment.314 If the individual scores above a 70, even if that score
falls within the test’s standard error of measurement (SEM), no further
analysis is needed and the individual cannot be deemed sufficiently
developmentally disabled. 315 For Florida, a score of 70 or lower was a
threshold requirement before other evidence of developmental disability
could be considered.316
In 1978, Freddie Lee Hall and his accomplice murdered Karol Hurst
after kidnapping, beating and raping her. 317 They then killed a sheriff’s
deputy and Hall received the death penalty.318
The Supreme Court ruled in 1987 that death penalty candidates must
be allowed to present non-statutory mitigating evidence during sentencing;
Hall’s death sentence was re-litigated. 319 During these hearings, Hall
presented significant evidence of developmental disability but the jury
nevertheless imposed the death penalty. 320 In 2002, following the high
court’s determination that those who are developmentally disabled could not
be executed, Hall again challenged his death sentence.321 Although Hall had
taken nine IQ tests resulting in scores ranging from 60–80, the sentencing
court considered only those scores above 70. Because these did not meet the
threshold required by Florida law for sufficient developmental disability, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal, upholding his death
sentence.322
Justice Kennedy (writing also for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan
and Sotomayor) found Florida’s use of a strict 70 IQ score cutoff in
determining developmental disability to be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 323 Kennedy first noted that protections against cruel and
unusual punishments must be evaluated using the “evolving standards of

language and also use intellectual disability when referring to what was previously termed
mental retardation.
314
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1994–95.
315
Id. at 1994–95.
316
Id.
317
Id. at 1990.
318
Id.
319
Id. at 1991.
320
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991.
321
Id. at 1991-92.
322
Id. at 1992.
323
Id. at 2000–01.
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decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 324 and by this
standard, Kennedy found that Florida’s use of a strict cut-off ignored
established medical practices. 325 Kennedy wrote, “The professionals who
design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ
test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range.”326
Further, Kennedy held that by failing to take the standard error into
consideration, Florida’s formulation ran contrary to what a majority of states
use in implementing Atkins.327 Kennedy found, “The rejection of the strict 70
cutoff in the vast majority of States and the ‘consistency in the trend’ toward
recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that our society
does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane.”328
Moreover, Kennedy noted that the ruling in Atkins itself appears to
reject the use of a strict cutoff.329 Based then on the guidance provided by the
medical professionals, the states, and Atkins, Kennedy found Florida’s
scheme for implementing Atkins to be unconstitutional and a threshold
requirement of a test score of 70 without considering other factors such as
measurement error to be unsound. 330 As Kennedy noted, “Intellectual
disability is a condition, not a number.”331
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion332 that was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Alito found the Florida
scheme consistent with the Constitution, in part because the state used
multiple test scores which, according to Alito, accounted for the risk of
measurement error. 333 Alito urged the Court not to impose a national
standard for the implementing the mandates of Atkins. 334 That
recommendation is consistent with the general tendency among the
dissenters to defer to conservative positions articulated at the state level.335

324

Id. at 1992 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Hall, 134 S. Ct at 1994–95.
326
Id. at 1995.
327
Id. at 1996.
328
Id. at 1998.
329
Id. at 1999.
330
Id. at 2000–1.
331
Hall, 134 S. Ct at 2001.
332
Id. at 2001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
333
Id. at 2011.
334
Id. at 2002.
335
See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Alito’s Dissents Show Deference
to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/03/
politics/politicsspecial1/03legal.html?ei (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (reviewing Alito’s
tendencies as a judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals); Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 97 (2011)
(Thomas, J. dissenting) (criticizing the majority for rejecting the judgments of legislatures and
state courts in a case involving life sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for disregarding decisions by state legislators and the prevalence of
statutes allowing juveniles to be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole).
325
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IV. DISCUSSION OF SELECT THEMES AND TRENDS
The foregoing quantitative336 and qualitative337 analyses reveal some
recurring trends with respect to criminal justice decisions, and suggest the
possibility of some new, emerging ones as well. The 2013–2014 U.S.
Supreme Court Term witnessed such decision-making tendencies at both the
Court and individual-Justice level. We begin with a discussion of key
patterns characterizing positions taken by individual members of the Court.
A. Individual-Level Patterns
The most recent term again demonstrated the influential role played
by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy’s historic record this term of being
on the winning side of every criminal justice decision338 differs only slightly
from his voting tendencies in criminal justice cases decided by the Roberts
Court in previous terms; during the first nine years of the Roberts Court,
Kennedy voted with the majority in over 90% of all criminal justice cases—
far more often than did any other Justice.339 This helps explain why scholars
and other Court watchers find that Kennedy often commands a
disproportionate amount of attention from both advocates before the Court
and from his fellow Justices, especially in closely divided cases.340 We see
no reason to expect this to change in the near future.
Kennedy’s role in providing a critical fifth vote was especially
apparent during the 2013–2014 Term. This was in part because none of the
marginally-winning coalitions in criminal justice cases consisted of all five
members of the conservative wing aligned against the four more liberal
Justices. In these cases ending in five-to-four decisions, Kennedy joined the
four members of the liberal wing to uphold regulations on gun purchases,
helped preserve a narrow conservative majority when Scalia dissented in a
Fourth Amendment case involving an anonymous tip, and authored the
Court’s decision establishing certain parameters of victim compensation
under the Violence Against Women Act that produced an unusual majority

336

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
338
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
339
See supra Table 2; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term,
supra note 14, at 247; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 327–42; 2009–2010 Term, supra
note 14, at 234; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 7; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 50–
85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1015–42; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 519–
45.
340
See, e.g., RYAN A. MALPHURS, RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE IN SUPREME COURT
ORAL ARGUMENTS: SENSEMAKING IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 98 (2013); Barnes, supra note 44;
Richard Wolf, From Gay Marriage to Voting Law, Kennedy is the Key, USA TODAY, (June
27, 2013, 11:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supremecourt-athony-kennedy-race-voting-abortion-gay-marriage/2161701/.
337
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configuration including Justices Kennedy, Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg and
Kagan. 341
Notably, Kennedy also provided an outcome-determining swing vote
in an important death penalty case during the 2013–2014 Term, 342 as he has
in several other capital punishment cases in past years.343
Breyer was the only Justice other than Kennedy to vote with the
majority in all criminal justice cases decided by a marginally-winning
coalition during the 2013–2014 Term, and it was in these cases that one of
the more striking tendencies in Justice Breyer’s voting behavior in criminal
justice matters reappears. 344 Namely, Navarette v. California serves as
another example of Justice Breyer providing a conservative vote in a Fourth
Amendment case while Justice Scalia voted with members of the liberal
wing.345 Justice Breyer’s longstanding support of law enforcement interests
on such issues demonstrates the challenge confronting the other members of
the liberal bloc in search and seizure cases, even when able to persuade one
of the more conservative Justices to join them.
However, the importance of Justice Scalia’s willingness to defect
from his fellow conservatives should not be minimized. Scalia’s recent string
341
Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; see supra notes 297–308 and accompanying text;
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; see supra notes 264–280 and accompanying text; Paroline, 134
S. Ct. at 1710; see supra notes 281–296; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986. See supra note 309 and
accompanying text.
342
Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
343
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the imposition
of capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18 years is
unconstitutional); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (barring the execution of
prisoners who do not have a rational understanding of the reason for their execution); Brewer
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007) (finding the lower court erred in denying relief after a
jury was prevented from meaningfully considering relevant mitigating evidence); Abdul-Kabir
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007) (finding the state’s jury instructions for capital sentencing
to be inadequate); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007) (finding the lower court erred when
evaluating whether an unconstitutional jury instruction invalidated a death sentence). Kennedy
also wrote for four liberal Justices in Graham v. Florida, which held that it was
unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Grahan, 560 U.S. at 48. Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence made
Graham a six-to-three decision.
344
See supra Part III.D.
345
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; see, e.g., King, 133 S. Ct. at 1958 (holding that it
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to take without a warrant a cheek swab for DNA
analysis of someone held in custody after being arrested for a serious offense based on
probable cause, ending in the same line up of Justices as Navarette); Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (finding that police use of a drug-sniffing dog on the porch of a home was
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and consequently required a search
warrant, ending in a liberal decision in which Scalia and Thomas voted with the three women
on the Court and Breyer supported law enforcement interests in dissent); Jacob Gershman,
The Fourth Amendment’s Strange Bedfellows, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, June 3, 2013 6:34 PM,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/06/03/the-fourth-amendments-strange-bedfellows/
(quoting
Orin Kerr of George Washington University Law School, ‘“Justice Scalia has been on the
defense side of every non-unanimous Fourth Amendment case” while Justice Breyer has come
down on the side of the government.’)..
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of votes and opinions in which he joined his liberal colleagues in supporting
Fourth Amendment rights may be due to his purported “longstanding
libertarian streak in some civil liberties cases.”346 With his claimed adherence
to an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, 347 Scalia’s
decisions concerning constitutional rights in criminal justice most frequently
support assertions of authority by police and prosecutors rather than rights
claims by suspects and defendants. 348 Scalia’s understanding of the
Constitution’s original meaning, however, has led in recent terms to his
outspoken support for protecting Fourth Amendment rights in prominent
decisions concerning search and seizure.349 In United States v. Jones, Scalia
wrote the majority opinion declaring that the use of a GPS tracking device on
a suspected drug trafficker’s car constituted a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment that required authorization by a warrant or other permissible
justification. 350 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Florida v. Jardines
similarly barred police officers without a warrant from seeking evidence by
bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the front door of a home in order to
investigate a suspected drug house. 351 He also joined the Court’s liberals
when he wrote a strong dissenting opinion in Maryland v. King against the
majority’s approval of a state statute authorizing mandatory DNA sample
extractions from unconvicted individuals arrested for certain serious
crimes.352 Similarly, in Missouri v. McNeely, Scalia voted to require police
officers to seek a warrant when possible before drawing blood samples from
suspected drunk drivers notwithstanding the state’s arguments that
warrantless blood draws are essential because of the rapid disappearance of
evidence (i.e., natural reduction of blood alcohol level) over time.353 In the
2013–2014 Term, Scalia continued this recent trend of outspoken support for
Fourth Amendment rights with his dissenting opinion, joined by the Court’s
most liberal Justices, in Navarette v. California354 that objected to reliance on
an anonymous tip as the basis for a police traffic stop.355 Although it is too
soon to judge whether these cases reflect changes in Scalia’s approach to

346
See supra note accompanying text 345; Scott Lemieux, Scalia Gets It Right,
AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, (June 3, 2013), prospect.org/article/scalia-gets-it-right.
347
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 38 (1997).
348
Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi M. McCall, Antonin Scalia: Outspoken and
Influential Originalist, in CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL
M. MCCALL, eds., THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 (2011).
349
See, e.g., Lemieux, supra note 346 (noting Scalia’s dissenting opinion against
mandatory extraction of DNA samples from arrestees in Maryland v. King).
350
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
351
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409, 1417–18.
352
King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
353
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013).
354
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
355
See supra notes 276–280 and accompanying text.
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understanding the Fourth Amendment356 or merely a flurry of specific issues
that call forth his preexisting viewpoints on situations in which protections
against improper searches should exist, 357 the recent term helped to
demonstrate that his recent role as a protector of Fourth Amendment rights
continues.
While Scalia remains a dependable conservative on most other
criminal justice issues, his conservative voting record lags significantly
behind that of Justice Alito who has now posted the highest percent
conservative voting in criminal justice cases in seven of the last eight
terms.358 During the 2013–2014 Term, Alito seemed especially inclined to
call for deference to state court decisions.359 Such use of deference in support
of law enforcement interests echoes arguments commonly made in the past
by Justices Thomas360 and Scalia.361 Thus, it seems likely that interpretational
preferences regarding certain views of states’ rights and judicial constraint
will continue to be expressed frequently on the Court for the foreseeable
future to justify particular conservative positions in the area of criminal
justice.

356
There is evidence that Scalia changed his interpretive approach with respect to
one criminal justice issue: prisoners’ rights. Initially, Scalia’s prisoners’ rights decisions
appeared to involve strategic and controversial characterizations of precedents as a means to
shape new doctrines without reference to his usual claim of following originalism. Christopher
E. Smith, The Malleability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisoners’
Rights, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 73, 84–87, 89–95 (2001). However, Scalia later switched to
more consistent application of his claimed adherence to originalism after he was apparently
persuaded to do so by Justice Thomas’s strong assertion of an originalism perspective in such
cases. Jan Crawford Greenburg, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 120 (2007).
357
There were earlier Fourth Amendment cases in which Scalia strongly
supported individual rights, thus indicating that certain issues elicited a rights-protective
viewpoint from him. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (Scalia-authored
majority opinion, joined by the Court’s most liberal justices, forbidding police officers from
warrantless movement of electronic items in plain view in order to see if their serial numbers
provided evidence that they were stolen); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Scaliaauthored majority opinion forbidding warrantless use of heat-detection device pointed at
outside of home in order to investigate whether the home contained lights used for indoor
cultivation of marijuana).
358
During the 2011–2012 Term, Justice Thomas held the most conservative voting
record in criminal justice cases. In all other years since the 2006–2007 Term, Alito has held
that position. See supra note 34 and accompanying table; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14.
359
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 67 (noting deference as a justification
for Alito’s majority opinion in Burt v. Titlow regarding an ineffective counsel claim); and
supra text accompanying note 333 and accompanying text (noting Alito’s dissent in Hall v.
Florida, in which he urged the Court to avoid imposing a national implementation standard
for determining the cognitive development of those facing the death penalty).
360
See, e.g., Joyce A. Baugh, Clarence Thomas: Consistent, Conservative, &
Contrarian, in CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL M.
MCCALL, eds., THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231, 237-8, 240-1
(2011).
361
See, e.g., Smith & McCall, supra note 348, at 174.
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At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justice Sotomayor
posted for the third consecutive term either the most or second most liberal
voting rate (behind Ginsburg) in criminal justice cases decided by the
Court. 362 This suggests that Sotomayor may be Ginsburg’s increasingly
likely heir as the leading liberal voice on the Court. 363 Moreover, the
tendency of Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg and Kagan to support liberal
positions and to agree with one another—in criminal justice and other
cases—has generated substantial interest in this liberal bloc of three
women.364 Ginsburg, herself, seems to have suggested that the importance of
this bloc may affect her decision on whether or not to retire.365
B. Court-Level Patterns
A seemingly paradoxical set of themes characterized the 2013–2014
Term with respect to broader voting patterns in criminal justice cases. First,
an unusually high portion of cases decided unanimously blurred some of the
typically clear distinctions between the liberal and conservative wings of the
Court.366 Given the degree to which this distribution contrasts with those in
prior terms, it seems prudent at this juncture to interpret the level of
consensus during the most recent term as a product of the idiosyncratic mix
of issues decided rather than as the sign of an emerging trend.367 Second,
other indicators suggest the ideological divide on the Court not only
362
See supra Table 2; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term,
supra note 14, at 247.
363
See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Signals She Has No
Plans to Retire Soon, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-courtginsburg-20140921-story.html#page=1 (“At 81, Ginsburg has emerged as the Court’s liberal
leader . . . . [A]s she begins her 22nd year on the high court, Ginsburg is at the height of her
influence and public acclaim.”); Some judicial scholars over the last few years have suggested
that Sotomayor eventually might assume such a role. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & April
Sanford, The Roberts Court and Wrongful Convictions, 32 ST. LOUIS U PUB. L. REV. 307, 315
(2013) (contemplating Sotomayor’s potential role in wrongful conviction cases given the
retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens—the Court’s previous, leading liberal voice on the
topic); David Fontana, Sonia Sotomayor: How She Became the Public Face of the Supreme
Court’s Liberal Wing, NEW REPUBLIC, June 29, 2011, http://www.newrepublic.com/article
/politics/91013/sonia-sotomayor-supreme-court-liberal-voice (asserting that Sotomayor’s
reliably liberal vote on a variety of issues and her engaging style makes her an especially
likely leader of the liberal wing in the eyes of the public).
364
See supra Tables 2, 3 and 4; see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Three Justices Bound by
Beliefs, Not Just Gender, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/us/
bound-together-on-the-court-but-by-beliefs-not-gender.html?_r=0.
365
Amy Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Retirement Dissent, THE NEW YORKER,
Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-retire
ment-dissent (quoting Ginsburg response from an interview with Elle Magazine, “When
Sandra [Day O’Connor] left, I was all alone. I’m rather small, so when I go with all these men
in this tiny room. Now Kagan is on my left, and Sotomayor is on my right. So we look like
we’re really part of the Court and we’re here to stay.”).
366
See supra Table 1; see supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
367
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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persisted, but may have hardened somewhat. For example, the unusually
large number of voting blocs that emerged this term show that most Justices
voted with other members of their respective wing at very high rates, with
only a couple of Justices falling outside of a traditional bloc. 368 The low
level of agreement among members of different camps in non-unanimous
decisions and the tendency of such decisions to align the most conservative
Justices against the most liberal ones, may jeopardize the perceived
legitimacy of the Court if the public increasingly comes to see the Court’s
decisions as products of an ideological divide. As one long-time Court
observer warned, “The perception that partisan politics has infected the
court’s work may do lasting damage to its prestige and authority and to
Americans’ faith in the rule of law.”369
A particularly interesting set of findings this term regard the
potentially strategic use of opinion assignments by the Chief Justice.370 For
example, Roberts assigned the writing of all five liberal, unanimous
decisions to conservative Justices. 371 While several factors undoubtedly
influenced these choices by the Chief Justice, by assigning liberal decisions
to the Court’s more conservative members, Roberts likely minimized the
chances of defection from unanimous rulings, while limiting the degree of
liberalism of some opinions, thereby reducing the degree to which the
resulting policies diverged from his preferred positions.372
Evidence for such motivations seems strongest in unanimous
opinions that Roberts self-assigned.373 In writing the Court’s much awaited
opinion in Bond v. United States, for example, Roberts avoided further
exposing the divide on the Court regarding constitutional interpretations by
resolving the case on statutory grounds issues arising from an act
implementing a treaty. 374 This not only preserved unanimity at least in
judgment, but also likely limited the expression of more liberal

368
See supra Tables 3 and 4; See also supra note 30 and accompanying text
(showing that Breyer’s voting tendencies did not place him in a liberal voting bloc, nor did
Kennedy’s align strongly with those of other conservatives though he did vote often with
certain members of the liberal wing).
369
Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y. edition) (May 11, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=
1.
370
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT, 125 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that the
Chief Justice assigns the Court’s opinion when he is in the majority).
371
See supra note 122.
372
See, e.g., Sandra L. Wood, Linda Camp Keith, Drew Noble Lanier, & Ayo
Ogundele, Opinion Assignment and the Chief Justice: 1988–1940, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 798, 798–
800 (2000) (summarizing traditional models explaining opinion assignment choices).
373
Such cases possess added relevance in that for the second year in a row, Chief
Justice Roberts did not author a single non-unanimous criminal justice decision. See supra
Parts III.B–D; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40.
374
See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077; see supra notes 184–193 and accompanying text.
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interpretations of sweeping congressional powers than if the constitutional
issues had been the focus.375
A similar example also illustrates the purported tendency of Chief
Justice John Roberts to seek incremental change in legal doctrine rather than
support reversals of precedent that lead to sudden and dramatic redefinitions
of the law and constitutional rights. 376 Further, this approach reportedly
frustrates his conservative allies who want to move faster in reworking the
law to fit their visions of proper constitutional interpretation.377 Consistent
with these reports, evidence emerged in a criminal justice case in the 2013–
2014 Term to support these observations. In McCullen v. Coakley,
concerning the free speech rights of anti-abortion protesters, Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion struck down the restrictive Massachusetts law but
left in place other precedents concerning the possibility of time, place, and
manner restrictions on protests outside abortion clinics.378 By contrast, in his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expressed frustration with the Roberts
majority opinion for failing to also overrule other precedents that left in place
possible restrictions on abortion clinic protests.379
For purposes of criminal justice law and policy, the development
during the 2013–2014 Term that could be most significant if it continues
concerns the small number of criminal justice cases accepted for decision.380
The Roberts Courts has received considerable attention and criticism for its
pursuit of an activist agenda aimed at reworking law to support conservative
political values and policy preferences. 381 It may be that the majority’s
purportedly agenda-driven attention382 to other continuing disputed matters
of law and policy, such as voting rights,383 same-sex marriage,384 and health-

375

Admittedly, such expressions may have been limited to dissents.
Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme Court, supra note 12.
377
Adam Liptak, Roberts’s Incremental Approach Frustrates Supreme Court
Allies, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/us/supreme-courtshows-restraint-in-voting-to-overrule-precedents.html. This point also applies to Roberts’s
opinion in Bond to which a disgruntled Scalia authored a concurring opinion (see supra notes
194–206 and accompanying text).
378
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.
379
Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring).
380
See supra notes 14–19, and supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
381
See Editorial, Activism and the Roberts Court, N.Y TIMES, March 29, 2012, at
A26; Anne Marie Lofaso, Judicial Activism on the Roberts Court: Anti-Union Ideology
Driving Analysis, AM. CON. SOC. BLOG (July 2, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog
/judicial-activism-on-the-roberts-court-anti-union-ideology-driving-the-analysis;
Adam
Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist,’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2013, at A1; Noah Feldman, Roberts Court Cloaks Activism in Complexity,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-10-16/
roberts-court-cloaks-activism-in-complexity.
382
Supra note 372.
383
Adam Liptak, Justices Enter Into Dispute Over Districts Alabama Set, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A12.
376
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care reform, 385 will lead to less attention to criminal justice issues in
subsequent terms. If the trend toward accepting fewer criminal justice cases
continues, those cases that are reviewed and the issues they raise will gain
added significance. Under such circumstances, future assessments might
expect the mix of questions reaching the Court to change as the opportunities
for Justices to weigh and express competing interpretations of due process,
the reasonableness of police behavior, and other criminal justice issues
become more constrained. These and other potential implications of patterns
emerging from the Court’s criminal justice decisions during the 2013–2014
Term remain to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Although it is difficult to know if voting data for any individual term
manifested key characteristics that serve as harbingers of future terms, the
individual decisions during every term are important as they establish
precedents for judges and other actors in the system to follow. 386 Moreover,
individual Justices’ opinions and case outcomes may, when analyzed in light
of other decisions from recent terms, raise important questions about
developments occurring at the high court.387
Despite the continued shrinking of the Supreme Court docket,388 the
2013–2014 Term produced important decisions in the area of criminal justice
likely to have lasting effects. 389 Some questions like those regarding a
defendant’s qualifications to receive the death penalty sharply divided the
384
Adam Liptak, Both Sides in Gay Marriage Fight in Utah Agree: Supreme
Court Should Hear Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/
us/politics/utah-gay-marriage-lawyers-ask-supreme-court-to-act.html.
385
Adam Liptak, Birth Control Order Deepens Divide Among Justices, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/us/politics/supreme-court-ordersuspends-contraception-rule-for-christian-college.html.
386
See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text (“[I]t is likely that recent
swings in the share of criminal justice cases decided unanimously are pushed more by the
different grouping of issues heard in various Terms than by fundamental changes in the
general level of agreement on the Court.”).
387
For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014), concerning family-owned corporations’ option to avoid covering
contraceptives in employee medical coverage is seen by critics as part of a pattern of Supreme
Court decisions that increasingly denigrate women’s rights while simultaneously showing
greater support for the rights of gays and lesbians. Adam Liptak, Justices’ Rulings Advance
Gays; Women Less So, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014, at A1.
388
See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
389
For example, of the 11 “key” decisions issued by the Supreme Court during the
2013–2014 Term as identified by The New York Times, three involved criminal justice related
cases. See Key Supreme Court Decisions 2014, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/19/us/major-supreme-court-decisions-in2014.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%222%22%3A%22RI%3A18%
22. These are McCullen v. Coakley, Riley v. California, and Hall v. Florida. See supra notes
144–160; supra notes 123–143 and accompany text; supra notes 309–335 and accompanying
text.
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Court, 390 while others found broad consensus such as when the Court
considered privacy expectations in an increasingly technology-driven
society.391
Findings suggest several potentially fertile areas for judicial scholars
to examine more rigorously. For example, Roberts’s criminal justice opinion
assignments—especially to himself—seem to justify the label of ‘skillful
strategist’ that some have applied to the Chief Justice. 392 Further research
might explore the degree to which strategic considerations not only explain
the distribution of criminal justice opinion authorship across different
Justices, but also the scope of decisions produced. This appears to be
particularly instructive given Roberts’s presumed preference for slow,
incremental changes to legal doctrine, at least on certain issues.393
Subsequent examinations also might gauge whether the influence of
the Court’s more ideologically consistent voters (e.g., Alito among
conservatives and Sotomayor among liberals)394 increases or decreases if the
current ideological divide on the Court persists, and especially if it widens.
Relatedly, students of the judiciary may wish to closely monitor public
opinion regarding the perceived legitimacy of the Court, particularly if
voting alignments lead to a growing sense that the Court’s criminal justice
and other decisions are products of partisan differences.
Kennedy’s presence in all of the Court’s majorities in criminal
justice cases this Term underscores his role not only as the Court’s median
voter but also as its leading swing voter.395 The degree to which the liberal
bloc can garner Kennedy’s support likely will continue to be an important
predictor of the direction of future Supreme Court decisions in criminal
justice cases. However, one should not overlook the importance of Scalia,
Breyer and other Justices who might provide an outcome-determining vote in
any given case as the issues addressed and agreement among groups of
Justices undoubtedly will shift—even if only subtly—from term to term.

390

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473.
392
E.g., Adam Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1.
393
See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
394
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
395
See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33; Lane, supra note 44.
391
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